We study a two-stage game with capacity precommitment followed by price competition where …rms have incomplete information about their rival's marginal cost. The game has a Cournot outcome if and only if the lowest possible marginal cost is su¢ ciently high relative to the expected marginal cost.
Introduction
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) (hereafter K&S) prove that in a two-stage game where …rms choose capacities followed by price, the unique Nash equilibrium has the Cournot outcome. A natural question is: how does uncertainty about the rival …rm's cost e¤ect the coincidence with the Cournot model? The premise of this paper is to prove the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a two-stage game to have a Cournot outcome when …rms are uncertain about their rival's marginal cost of capacity. In addition, we characterize exactly when there is A¢ liation: Department of Economics, Orfalea College of Business, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407; e-mail: jlepore@calpoly.edu; phone: (805) 756-1618; fax : (805) 756-1473. an equilibrium with a Cournot outcome for both e¢ cient and proportional rationed residual demand. 1 We show that the Cournot outcome is an equilibrium of the two-stage game if and only if the Cournot equilibrium is such that at the lowest capacity cost realizations, …rms'capacities lead to market clearing prices. 2 The wider the dispersion of cost uncertainty, the greater the lower bound cost must be for the K&S result to be possible.
To provide a concrete illustration of our results, we calculate an example with linear demand and a uniform distribution over marginal costs. With e¢ cient rationing, there is an equilibrium with a Cournot outcome if and only if three times the lower bound marginal cost is weakly greater than the upper bound marginal cost, while under proportional rationing, the bounds must be closer.
The Model Basics
Consider an industry with two …rms producing a single homogeneous product. The two …rms compete in a game where they …rst choose capacities independently and simultaneously; these choices are made public, then prices are chosen independently and simultaneously. The market demand is D : R + 7 ! R + . The inverse demand is P : R + 7 ! R + . Demand is bounded when the market price is zero, so X = D(0) < 1. The following assumptions are maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 (A1) P (x) is twice-continuously di¤erentiable, strictly positive, strictly decreasing, and concave 8x 2 (0; X). In addition, P (x) = 0, 8x X. Assumption 2 (A2) 9 2 R + r f1g such that
Each …rm's capacity provides an absolute limit on the number of units it can produce: its cost of production is zero up to capacity, and in…nite for any quantity beyond. Each …rm faces a constant marginal cost of capacity.
Assumption 3 (A3) Each …rm's marginal cost of capacity is independently drawn with probability measure from A = a; _ a . has no mass points and is such that (A) = 1 and (S) < 1, 8S A. 1 K&S only address e¢ cient rationing. 2 Here Cournot outcome is used to refer to the Cournot outcome of a game with incomplete cost information. 3 The arguments of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 are greatly simpli…ed based on the restrictions on . If we allow to be a measure without full support, the primary content is una¤ected. Assumption 4 (A4) Each …rm's cost of capacity permits positive pro…t: a < P (0).
Next we move to characterizing the equilibria of the Cournot game with incomplete cost information.
The Cournot Game
We …rst present the basic features of the Cournot game with uncertain costs (hereafter UC). We take the generic …rm to have marginal cost a and capacity x. Denote by Q = (q ) 2A , the capacity choice for each possible rival with cost 2 A.
This function is de…ned for all (x; Q); it is twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave for all x 2 (0; X max 2A q ). Firm a's UC best response to Q is
Our …rst result is a condition under which the UC game has a unique equilibrium.
Theorem 1
In the UC game de…ned by A1-4, if there is an equilibrium Q = (q a ) a2A such that q a < _ X=2, then Q is the unique equilibrium such that q a < _
X=2.
For the case of linear demand, there is always a Q such that q a < _ X=2.
Proof. Notice that at such Q ; c a is di¤erentiable. Hence, based on the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem the …rst order condition is necessary. Based on A1&A2 for all a 2 A the necessary condition is shown below,
First we show that if a 0 > a, then q a 0 < q a . Suppose to the contrary that q a 0 > q a for a 0 > a. Based on the strict concavity of each revenue function
Hence, if condition (3) for cost a 0 holds for q a 0 , then it cannot also hold true for a at q a , a contradiction.
To prove that there is only one equilibrium such that q a < _ X=2, we show that the best response a (Q) is a contraction mapping on
then a (Q) is a contraction mapping. The expression in (4) can be rewritten as
Since, both terms in the absolute value are non-positive, (5) can be simpli…ed to E [P 0 (x + q )] < 0, which must be true based on A1.
The Pricing Subgames
Now let us begin to analyze the two-stage game. The character of the Nash equilibrium in any pricing subgame will depend on …rms'capacities (x; y).
Before we move to the characterization of the Nash equilibria of pricing subgames, we formally address the way in which demand is rationed.
Assumption 5 (A5)
The residual demand is rationed according to either the e¢ cient or proportional rule.
More speci…cally, the demand served by …rm i is:
where r 2 fe; pg, "e" represents "e¢ cient rationing" and "p" represents "proportional rationing."The two residual demands for r = e and r = p are:
. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) show that mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exist in all pricing games. The characterization of the pricing subgames below follows from Lepore P (x + y)x.
Denoted by q c , the zero cost Cournot equilibrium capacity. Denote by q m , the zero cost monopoly capacity.
For either rationing rule, equilibrium pricing is divided into three regions based on the …xed capacities (x; y).
Bertrand pricing:
Cournot pricing:
_ X] j x r(y) and y r(x)
o .
Mixed strategy pricing:
The Nash equilibrium unique expected revenue of …rm i is:
where,
r , then the expected revenue of each …rm is determined by the lowest price in the support of mixed strategy of the smaller …rms. Denote by p r (x; y), this price when x y.
The Capacity Choice Game
The capacity choice expected pro…t given Nash equilibrium pricing is de…ned as
and the corresponding capacity choice best response of …rm a to Q is given by 
Results
We move to the primary result of the paper; a characterization for when the capacity choice game has an UC outcome.
Theorem 2
Suppose that Q such that q a < _ X=2. In the capacity choice game de…ned by A1-5, the UC capacities are an equilibrium if and only if q a ; q a 2 C r .
As a preliminary result, we establish that the right-hand derivative of the expected pro…t being equal to zero is necessary for Q to be an equilibrium of the capacity choice game.
For notational convenience, we write the …rst partial derivative of a function f (x; y) in the argument x at (x; y) as @ x f (x; y) and right-hand and left-hand partial as @ + x f (x; y) and @ x f (x; y), respectfully. 
Only at symmetric capacities x = y can R r (x; y) be non-di¤erentiable, hence only at (q a ; q a ), might @ + x R r (q a ; q a ) 6 = @ x R r (q a ; q a ). Since, the probability measure has no mass points and
Thus, the left-hand derivative at Q is negative, which implies an arbitrarily small increase in capacity is preferred to q a , a contradiction.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 2 we restate some facts established in Lepore (2008) which will be necessary for our proof. First, de…ne
where
and e
We synthesis the …rst fact for the e¢ cient and proportional rules:
This is shown in Lepore (2008) : for r = e in the proof of Lemma 2, while for r = p, this is fact (P1).
The next two facts are only relevant for proportional rationing and shown in Lepore (2008) as (P2) and Theorem 2, respectfully.
We also use the strict concavity of the Cournot revenue function, which we denote (C).
Proof of Theorem 2.
(Necessity) If Q is an equilibrium, then (y). Suppose to the contrary that q a ; q a = 2 C r and Q is an equilibrium.
De…ne A r (q a ) = f 0 2 A j q a ; q 0 2 M r g. Based on A3 and since Q is such that
First take r = e, then @ + x R e q a ; q = 0 8 2 A e (q a ), since the larger …rm's capacity plays no role in its expected revenue. In the Cournot game P 0 q a +a + P q a + q < 0 8 2 A e (q a ).
Second take r = p, then @ + x R p q a ; q 0 8 2 A p (q a ), since the larger …rm's capacity always weakly increases its expected revenue.
For r 2 fe; pg, if 2 A r A r (q a ), then from (F1) and (F3), @ + x R r q a ; q = @ + x R c q a ; q . Hence, all expected marginal revenues are weakly less in either capacity choice game, and for a positive probability mass of states the marginal revenues are strictly less. Putting this together, @ We use this to show there cannot be a pro…t increasing defection from q a , 8a 2 A. We can immediately dismiss q a < q a , because q a leads to Cournot pricing, 8a 2 A. Thus, where the weak inequality it follows from q a 2 a (Q ).
We are left to show 8a 2 A defections q a > q a such that q a ; q a 2 M r cannot be pro…t increasing.
First take r = e, and there are two cases: (i) q a q and (ii) q a < q . (i) is immediate since, @ + x R e (q a ; q ) = 0 < @ + x R e (q a ; q ) = P 0 (q a + q ) q a + P (q a + q ) and (ii) follows immediately from fact (F1). Thus, 8a 2 A and q a > q a , Next take r = p. We …rst show that for all such q a , @
. This shown through the following sequences of inequalities, where the fact used is in parentheses above the relation:
P 0 (q a + q ) q a + P (q a + q ) .
8 2 A r A p (q a ), pricing is Cournot and from (F1), @ x e R r (q a ; q ) = @ x P (q a ; q ). Putting this all together, 8a 2 A and q a > q a , 
Examples
The following examples provide a context for understanding condition (y).
Take the inverse demand P (q) = maxf q; 0g, and uniform distributed uncertainty on A. We characterize the set of lower and upper bounds marginal costs, a and _ a, such that the there is an equilibrium of the capacity choice game with a UC outcome.
For e¢ cient rationing, (y) reduces to _ a 3a.
(9)
The range of cost bounds such that Q is an equilibrium is shown in Figure 1 .
For proportional rationing, (y) reduces to _ a 3a 2 :
The range of cost bounds such that Q is an equilibrium is shown in Figure 2 .
Thus, the greater the lowest bound marginal cost and the less the span between the marginal cost bounds, the more likely the UC outcome is an equilibrium.
